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This article uses the concept of convenience as an analytical prompt to investigate how ideas about work organize a cash-based social assistance
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households in Tanzania. Cash transfers as components of social assistance not predicated on working confront assumptions many Tanzanians share
about the importance of work as foundational to self-reliance as the bedrock of personal and national development. The program uses existing
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World Bank conceptualizations of social assistance as a productive investment. Ethnographic research at the interface between program implementors
and beneficiaries provides insights into the attitudes many Tanzanians hold about development and their place in it and sheds light on the ambivalent
feelings of insecure middle classes about changing forms of state-managed social assistance. Implementation involves an intricate orchestration
of prescriptive ideals about labor, entitlement, and value organized around labor-intensive bureaucratic procedures, public works, and community
sensitization sessions. Labor making and making visible different kinds of work characterize program implementation. Prevailing attitudes toward
social assistance, and the class relations through which they are realized, are perpetuated through ostensibly novel programs.
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In a piece examining why families in the United Kingdom eat preprepared foods, the sociologist Alan Warde (1999,
522) describes the etymology of convenience. The term gradually acquired its contemporary associations of quick-
ness and efficiency through the mid-twentieth century as it came to mean a reduction in the time and labor required
by an activity, prior to which it had only conveyed ease of use. Convenience assumes an identity with the “mod-
ern” via conceptualizations of labor saving and the proliferation of devices that make this possible, transforming the
everyday domestic experience of the middle classes in many parts of the world and the material framing of aspi-
rations through appliances, technology, and fast foods as key cultural signifiers (Shove 2003). Geographers Peck
and Theodore (2015) propose that equivalent processes of speeding up and ease of replication operate in policy
fields. “Fast” policy refers to the accelerated transnational mobility of standard social policy instruments through
networks of consultants, experts, and brokers. The “quick fixes” they disseminate are authoritatively legitimated
through best-practice claims based on evidence and research, much of it generated through the same expert net-
works and communities of practice (Peck 2011, 172). Cash transfers promoted as highly replicable, effective across
all contexts, and amenable to scaled-up systems for delivery have been promoted as template “silver bullet” inter-
ventions to reduce poverty. Cash transfers financed through foreign aid are paradigmatic examples of fast policy
(Peck 2011, 172; Peck and Theodore 2015, 85–127).
This article uses the concept of convenience as an analytical prompt to investigate how ideas about work organize
a development cash transfer program in Tanzania. I explore the time-consuming processes involved in getting
payments to poor people and how the values and beliefs of the people engaged in carrying out the program align with
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“slow” forms of implementation. Productive Social Safety Nets (PSSN) is a national cash transfer program delivered
through local authorities as part of a decade-long fast policy trend initiated by northern development agencies. Cash
transfers as components of social assistance not predicated on working confront assumptions many Tanzanians
share about the importance of work as integral to the self-reliance (kujitegemea) that is foundational to personal
and national development. Ethnographic research at the interface between program implementors and beneficiaries
provides insights into the attitudes many Tanzanians hold about development and their place in it and sheds light
on the ambivalent feelings of insecure middle classes about changing forms of state-managed social assistance.
The PSSN program is mainly funded by the World Bank. Program logics creatively combine Tanzanian val-
ues around community responsibility for development with the bank’s conceptualization of social assistance as
productive investment using established architectures of community development. This centers on a representa-
tional distinction between the developmental disposition of hardworking middle-class people and the moral frailty
of the poor, whose proclivities toward handouts and reliance on others mean they require mobilization (Dawson
and Fouksman 2020; Seekings 2017). Implementation involves an intricate orchestration of prescriptive ideals about
labor, entitlement, and value organized around labor-intensive bureaucratic procedures, public works, and commu-
nity sensitization sessions that accompany cash payouts. Labor making and making visible different kinds of work
characterize program implementation. The modeling of social assistance as transitional welfare mediated through
the middle class as development exemplars builds on long-standing understandings of development in Tanzania
informed by colonial and postcolonial practices of community development (Chachage 1988, 201). Prevailing atti-
tudes toward social assistance, and the class relations through which they are realized, are perpetuated through
ostensibly novel programs (Steensland 2006).
The missing middle
Cash transfer programs provide small regular payments to households living in extreme poverty. Their rise to
prominence as instruments for foreign aid during the second decade of the twenty-first century owes much
to fast policy brokerage and the situational adaptability of cash payments within neoliberalizing development
narratives (Ballard 2013; Peck 2011). Cash delivery programs, which can be simply represented in budget terms,
can accommodate funding from different sources, while impacts can be claimed across sectoral boundaries
(Adesina 2011). Conditionalities are designed into cash transfer programs for political acceptability rather than
outcomes (Simpson 2018). Programs of this type in Ghana, Rwanda, Uganda, Ethiopia, and Tanzania aim to change
the behavior of the extreme poor by providing time-limited assistance. Change is incentivized through conditions
termed “co-responsibilities” that recipients must meet to remain eligible for payments (Ballard 2013). They may also
be required to attend training sessions, join savings groups, and undertake low-paid labor. Actual cash payments
may be a single element among multiple program activities (Nilsen 2020).
Research on cash transfers has proliferated exponentially as they have become a regular feature of the foreign aid
landscape. Practitioner-oriented scholarship has consistently emphasized the delivery advantages of cash transfers
in terms of implementation costs and beneficiary convenience (see Donovan 2015, 734). An apparent consensus
among development scholars and those adopting more critical positions insistently acclaims the transformative
potential of cash-based social assistance in terms of distributive politics and social policy (e.g., Barrientos and
Hulme 2009; Ferguson 2014, 2015; Hanlon et al. 2012). Variation in program design and the size of payments,
including whether payments are conditional or otherwise, renders generalization problematic. Regional patterns,
are, however, evident as effects of the geopolitical relations of aid and its policy transfers. In sub-Saharan Africa,
with the exception of state-funded welfare systems in southern Africa, the majority of cash-based social assistance
initiatives continue to be donor funded and project based, providing limited short-term coverage.1 Payment values
are low (Adesina 2011; Hickey and Seekings 2020; Simpson 2018).
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Foreign-funded cash transfer initiatives in sub-Saharan Africa are commonly reassembled hybrids of preexisting
community development and emergency relief packages, supplemented by payments, trainings, and ad hoc pilot
initiatives (Adesina 2011, 458; Devereux 2011, 422). Assertions that recent cash transfer interventions in the Global
South represent steps toward a “new politics of distribution” (Ferguson 2015) or a “substantial decommodification
of daily life” (Harris and Scully 2015, 416) overstate the social impacts of development cash-based social assistance
schemes, certainly in aid-recipient countries in eastern Africa. On the contrary, cash transfer schemes introduced
as part of donor-financed development programs reinscribe existing architectures of inequality (Bond 2016). They
do this through stratified systems of distributional recognition that determine the level of benefits deemed adequate
for poor households, and the minimum standard of living they imply (Sayer 2018), and through the social relations
that organize program implementation.
This article uses ethnographic research to investigate how a recently initiated cash transfer scheme reinscribes
existing development relations in Tanzania, including the axiomatic doctrine that poor people must assume
responsibility for their own development. It is based on twelve months of program-specific fieldwork in three
districts in mainland Tanzania in 2018–19.2 Research conducted in Ulanga District, Chamwino District, Dodoma
Region, and Temeke Urban District, on the edge of Tanzania’s largest city, Dar es Salaam, provides insights into
the reciprocal constitution of social policies and national cultures, which shape evolving attitudes toward social
assistance (Steensland 2006). I carried out interviews with beneficiaries, nonbeneficiaries, program staff, members
of local management committees, and local authority staff. Policy actors in Dodoma and Dar es Salaam, including
civil society and development agency representatives, were also interviewed.3 The research builds on several shorter
periods of fieldwork in Ulanga District, Morogoro Region, from 2012 examining economic change (Green 2017,
2019) and on my experience as policy consultant on social protection issues between 2005 and 2016.
Most research on cash transfer programs has been produced by, or for, the northern development agencies that
fund them (Adesina 2011, 460). Findings respond to shifting policy concerns, accentuating the “transformative”
potential of social protection (e.g., Sabates-Wheeler and Devereux 2008) and the need to secure “buy-in” from
political elites predisposed to believe that increases in welfare spending disincentive working (e.g., Lavers and
Hickey 2016; Niño-Zarazúa et al. 2012). A growing body of work addresses the social lives of cash transfers
beyond the constrictive framing of development research.4 Accounts from sub-Saharan Africa reveal the divisive
potential of targeted schemes in countries where the majority of households consider themselves to be in need.
Dissatisfaction with cash transfer schemes from low-income groups centers on the perceived injustices of being left
out (de Sardan 2018; Ellis 2012). Perhaps surprisingly, given the role of middle classes in determining acceptance, or
otherwise, of welfare policies in Africa and elsewhere (Somers and Block 2005; Steensland 2006), the perspectives
of people who are neither very poor nor very rich are less frequently considered (Adesina 2011, 466; Resnick 2015).
Intensifying skepticism toward benefits for the poor commonly accompanies proposals to expand cash-based
social assistance, even in countries that previously had minimal welfare provision (Seekings 2017). Hostility
toward welfare intensified in Botswana as state social protection coverage became more inclusive. Members of the
rising middle class were the most negative, convinced that social payments for poor people encouraged “laziness”
by discouraging working and fostering a “handout mentality” (Seekings 2017). Similarly, South Africans across
all income groups are suspicious of an expanded welfare system. This includes the young unemployed, whose
expectations of distributive claims are nevertheless framed in terms of working (Dawson and Fouksman 2020,
239–44; Ferguson 2013; Fouksman 2020, 299). The prevalence of such views, across the region, alongside serious
reservations about longer-term fiscal viability, account for hesitancy of governments toward extending cash-based
social assistance for working-age adults. Donor-adapted social assistance interventions in Ethiopia and Botswana
that have been promoted as cash transfer exemplars are being reoriented toward their original designs where
labor is exchanged for benefits in emergency work schemes (Lavers 2019, 665; Seekings 2017, 15). Cash transfer
initiatives promoted by foreign donors, and the policy advocacy with which they are packaged, are contested terrain
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for divergent ideological positions on social policy, including between different donor agencies (Devereux 2013;
Devereux and Roelen 2016; Hickey et al. 2019; Simpson 2018, 160).
Class concerns
The government of Tanzania has been implementing cash-based social assistance since an initial three-district pilot
in 2010. This was progressively extended to form PSSN, a national program that by 2018 reached 1.1 million, or
around 10%, of the poorest households in the country.5 Program design is guided by the World Bank representation
of social assistance as a temporary safety net that protects the economic and human capital of households living in
extreme poverty. Households receive a basic payment of 10,000 shillings a month, equivalent to around US$4 (Rosas
et al. 2019, 5). Those with young and school-age children receive additional small payments conditional on school
and clinic attendance. In 2018, the maximum monthly payment a household could receive was 38,000 shillings, paid
out every two months. Payments are made to a person designated as “responsible,” preferably a woman who, as the
representative of a beneficiary household, must ensure compliance with program conditions, including taking part
in program activities.6
PSSN is delivered through the Tanzania Social Action Fund (TASAF), a facility originally set up to support the
World Bank’s decentralization agenda (Lange 2008). It combines preexisting social action fund activities typical of
the region, such as low-paid public works, with newer development models, such as cash transfers, into a single
program. While cash transfers were implemented nationwide at the time of my fieldwork, other components set
out in the program document, notably public works and livelihood grants, were not yet operational in all districts.
This was due, in part, to funding shortfalls brought about by different ideological positions of government and
donors (Hickey and Seekings 2017, 21; Jacob and Pedersen 2018; Myamba and Ulriksen 2016).7 The government
of Tanzania did not meet cofunding targets during the first implementation cycle. Donor agencies committed to a
social protection agenda prioritized funding cash transfers over other program components.8
The Tanzanian government is reluctant to accept a vision of cash transfers as the initial step along an expansive
social protection pathway. It views cash transfers as a kind of aid provided within a conventionally conceived
development program in which local governments mobilize communities’ participation, through contributions
(michango) of cash and labor, toward the objectives of particular projects. Receiving benefits without participation
is antithetical to this moral economy of development, hence government’s strong preference for conditional
elements within program design and the inclusion of public works with a rhetorical emphasis on productive
activities (Jacob and Pedersen 2018; Myamba and Ulriksen 2016; Ulriksen 2020). The then president of Tanzania,
Dr. John Pombe Magufuli, elected in 2015, was committed to reviving the productivist ethic of Tanzanian socialism
(Lal 2012) in a policy approach predicated on personal and national self-reliance through working (Paget 2020).
In an intentional evocation of the “Uhuru na kazi” (Freedom and Work) slogan of Julius Nyerere’s postinde-
pendence nation building, the strapline of Magufuli’s first-term government (2015–20) was “Hapa Kazi Tu!”
(Just Work Here!).9
Reservations about extending welfare as discouraging working and being anti-development are echoed by
citizens in everyday conversations and across national media. Many Tanzanians who see themselves as situated
between the small elite and the majority of the population making a living just above the poverty line are deeply
ambivalent about cash-based social assistance. Payments to poor households, unless the person is very old or
incapacitated, should be of limited duration, involve some kind of work on the part of the recipient, and be directed
at achieving household self-reliance.10 People working in lower levels of public service or striving to secure a
foothold in the precarious marketplace of nonagricultural occupations regard themselves as vulnerable to taking
on the financial burden of new forms of social policy, in addition to their ongoing obligations to assist people
beyond their immediate families. Cash payments for adults who should be able to support themselves are not only
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too expensive for a poor country but also discourage people from working. “Here in Tanzania,” I was repeatedly
told, “we cannot afford a handout mentality.”
In Tanzania, as in other African countries with high levels of poverty, neither being poor nor seeking needed
assistance is stigmatized (Ferguson 2013; Scherz 2014). Relatives have a duty to help older family members and
children, including those of siblings and cousins. Ability to supply this in terms of care and education is a
demonstration of social standing (Howland et al. 2019, 12). People are expected to respond to solicitations from
relatives, friends, and neighbors for help in meeting health, wedding, and education expenses, including those
of higher-status others. Contributions in cash or kind must be made for weddings, funerals, and collections for
development projects. Claims to moral worth are relationally enacted through everyday interactions, such as asking
a neighbor for money for a ladle of cooking oil or taking a gift of food to an elderly relative. Ordinary exchanges of
cash, food, and labor are couched within conventions of reciprocity between people of similar status. Persons with
impairments caused by disability or extreme old age make concerted efforts to demonstrate their situation to others
so that they will be recognized as maskini, a person rendered so wretched by circumstances beyond the person’s
control that he or she merits unreciprocated assistance (Cliggett 2001, 105; Livingston 2003).11
Where the performance of equivalence cannot be sustained, giving or the power to give can segue into relations
of domination (Durham 1995, 116; Graeber 2009, 115–17). People of lower status are expected to indicate their
readiness to undertake tasks for higher-status patrons, as well as low-paid labor. These logics of status and recog-
nition through command over persons, whether one is waiting to be “sent” (to do something) by someone more
powerful or expecting to “send” someone, structure everyday social interactions along axes of age, class, and gender,
within and outside kinship. They also compose the frame through which social assistance programs are experienced
(Little 2014). The parameters of acceptable interdependencies, and associated behaviors, are dramatized through the
implementation of social assistance programs in which public officials and persons assuming leadership positions
perform relations of patronage to the poor on behalf of national governments. Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Pro-
gram (PSNP), on which the Tanzanian intervention is modeled, features public implementation sequences in which
very poor people are expected to perform the comportment of client status expected by their superiors. This involves
deference to government officials involved in delivering the program and submission to their command over labor
(Little 2014, 125). Lengthy waiting and subjection to vagaries of bureaucratic authority are recurrent dimensions of
cash-based development programs in many countries, along with low-paid manual labor (Balen 2018; Gupta 2012).
In Tanzania, where the current costs of social assistance for the extreme poor are met through foreign aid, the
future prospect of increased taxes for the middle classes only partly explains their suspicion toward cash transfer
schemes. Attitudes toward the possible expansion of public welfare in the future are informed by relations and
practices in the present. The burden of development must be borne by the people in need of it, mediated through
representatives of the middle classes, rather than financed by them. People seeking identification with middle
classes in low- and middle-income countries, whose self-definition is partially constituted through proximity to
development, actively seek roles in facilitating the development of others (Bujra 1983, 36; Pauli 2020; Pigg 1992).
Implementation of Tanzania’s social assistance program centers on public events at which beneficiaries are
instructed in the use of cash and their narration of trajectories of self-improvement as working.
Development through differentiation
Tanzania is an East African country with a population approaching 60 million. Colonial underdevelopment through
sustained underinvestment by Germany, then Britain, laid the foundations of twentieth-century disadvantage
relative to other countries in the region. In 1961, one year prior to independence from Britain, Tanganyika had just
176 secondary school students and 150 university graduates out of a population of just over 9 million (Mueller 1981,
472–78). The socialist policies of first president Julius Nyerere, directed toward national self-reliance (Lal 2012),
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could not resolve the systemic frailties in an agrarian economy based on peasant farming. Partial villagization and
nationalization of nascent enterprise created an economy and, by extension, a middle class wholly reliant on the
state, which controlled prices, imports, and investments (Diamond 1987, 577; Raikes 1978, 288).
Nyerere’s pro-equality policies were intended to prevent members of this expanding national elite from
consolidating their position through the acquisition of land and property. Policy declarations like the Leadership
Code, which prohibited senior leaders from charging rents on property, provided an ideological smoke screen for
the accelerating differentiation set in motion through the reorganization of the economy (Mueller 1981, 493). For
many state employees who found themselves relocated to work in rural areas, the central government’s deconcen-
tration policies (Freund 1981, 491; Raikes 1978, 313) created opportunities for business and investment strategies
across the country. This group rapidly evolved into a “bureaucratic bourgeoise” during the 1970s and 1980s
(Shivji 1975), securing its conditions of reproduction through private English-language schools and diversifying
its investments into farms, land, and trading businesses (Samoff 1979, 52). Investments in urban property and
successful side businesses, essential for maintaining incomes as salaries plummeted under structural adjustment,
positioned many advantageously for the onset of liberalization in the 1990s (Lugalla 1997; Tripp 1997). Class
expansion had cultural implications, distributing the normative values of a managerial mission-educated middle
class originating in the agricultural highlands who would come to interpret disadvantage through a denigrating
cultural frame of “laziness” and habits attributed to people with different livelihoods and from other parts of the
country (Caplan 2007; Diamond 1987, 591).
The ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi (Party of the Revolution, CCM) has remained in power throughout this
period. Tanzania was one of the first countries to participate in the Highly Indebted Poor Countries initiative of the
early 2000s, trading policy autonomy for debt relief (Green 2014). The poverty reduction strategy papers have been
superseded over the past decade by an invigorated policy nationalism articulated through the reinstatement of the
national development plan as the key policy instrument. Investments in infrastructure, increased borrowing, and
reduced reliance on donor finance are hallmarks and legacies of Magufuli’s policy regime.
Although Tanzania attained categorization as lower middle income in 2020, ambitions for industrialization led
economic development outlined in the second national development plan are confronted by the persistence of a
predominantly agricultural economy (Wuyts and Kilama 2016). A broader middle class has come into existence in
tandem with postliberalization economic growth and ensuing expansion of business and educational opportunities
across public and private sectors. People in this category, who see themselves as precariously positioned between
the mass of less-educated people in rural areas and cosmopolitan elites, enact their claim to class identity through
aspirational cultural practices around housing, eating, and working influenced by the lifestyles of national elites and
the prisms of national and international popular and social media (Heiman et al. 2021; Pauli 2020; Spronk 2014).
Most have completed some postsecondary education, live in urban areas, and hope to work in “modern” sections
of the economy. A growing minority, some with the generational and educational advantage that increases
their chances of salaried employment, form a lower rentier class (Boone 1990, 426). They pursue, at reduced
scale, the accumulation strategies set in place by their more fortunate forebears, who are now the national elite
(Diamond 1987, 583). People with even small amounts of capital, often earned through salaried work, aim to buy
land in rural areas and build housing in urban ones, from which they can earn rental income (Snyder et al. 2020,
5). Of the majority of Tanzanians who are smallholder farmers, an increasing proportion are laborers who also
farm on land they have rented from others (Greco 2015).
Differentials between low-end public-sector salaries and unskilled earnings no longer ensure access to invest-
ment opportunities available to previous generations of public servants combining income from salaries, enterprise,
and farming.12 Returns to investments in postprimary education fall with rising numbers of people who have
completed secondary school and university (Simson 2020). Formal-sector employment cannot keep pace with the
numbers of college and university graduates. Informal unpaid internships, often in the offices of a parent’s colleagues,
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are now not unusual for those hoping to obtain lower-level government employment, even in rural local authorities.
Schoolteachers, medical assistants, and local authority workers struggle to invest in land in rural areas and operate
microbusinesses. Rents from plots, rooms in houses under construction, and motorcycles are essential sources of
unearned income (Green 2015).
The economic uncertainty experienced by this group of people is embodied in the sense of aspiration put on
hold in the “not yet” houses with rooms unbuilt (Mercer 2014, 238, 243) and experiments in reorganizing obligations
between people of different socioeconomic situations within the same family (Neubert 2019; Noll 2016, 139–40).
They need resources on hand to respond to health emergencies requiring access to private clinics (Ellison 2014)
and to make contributions appropriate to their status for the weddings and funerals of family, friends, neighbors,
and work colleagues. They must be ready to assist less fortunate members of their immediate and extended families
with expenses for health, education, and daily life. A sense of being overwhelmed by incessant demands influences
people’s feelings toward social assistance. While some saw provision of support for the extreme poor as potentially
helpful, others feared that this would not reduce their own immediate obligations and would entail higher future
contributions to finance it once donor support ended liabilities. Peter, in his mid-thirties and working for an
international NGO, explained why this was unfair. “Me I am already paying. The relatives are always coming. I
am carrying many loads” (interview, September 8, 2015).13
The representation of self-reliance as moral necessity extends beyond political oratory. Living without work-
ing by depending on others is widely regarded as a form of parasitic exploitation (Brennan 2006, 400; Lal 2012,
215). Questioning the genuine need of people asking for money in public, even if they have severe physi-
cal impairments, is expected because it is widely believed that some people emulate the disabled to extract
money from others. Faustina, a senior manager in a government office, traveling between projects in a sleek
four-wheel drive, audibly tutted as she looked out on a young man on crutches begging in the central reser-
vation of a city thoroughfare. “What kind of maskini are you? You have two eyes and two hands!” (fieldnotes,
November 9, 2018).
Peter’s and Faustina’s rhetorical insistence that people living in poverty bear some responsibility for their
situation which they should show readiness to change resonates with the sentiments of middle classes in other
countries and times who maintain that their own successes are the result of education and hard work, while
seeking to naturalize narratives of blame within cultural framings (Somers and Block 2005, 267). In Tanzania, as
in other countries where class advantage has a distinctly locational dimension, perceptions of people brought up in
metropolitan towns and cities are influenced by idealized representations of what life is like in the rural areas they
think of as “home,” even if they have never lived there. “We don’t have poor people everywhere like this” (interview,
December 6, 2018), explained Rafael, a young community development officer from Arusha, indicating the sweep
of village settlements across the semi-arid landscape of Chamwino District.
A district councilor in Ulanga expressed his conviction that because the ultimate cause of poverty is habits
(tabia) and “mind-set,” cash payments could not address it (interview, February 7, 2019). Addressing the link
between mind-set and development was essential for long-term changes in the lives of poor households, a
government poverty expert explained. “Poverty is not missing money or things,” she said. “It’s poverty of ideas,
of thinking. If these people have money they waste it. They won’t use it like we [educated people] do” (interview,
November 30, 2018).
A local authority manager cynically recited the official description of the program as “uplifting poor households”
(kunusuru kaya maskini) through the trajectory of stabilization, supplementary income through public works, and
saving. “But,” he added, in a tone of exasperation, “speaking as myself and not as government, just giving these
people money is pointless. They will only become dependent and lazy” (interview, November 12, 2018). Educated
people have a responsibility to help communities achieve development by showing them that change is possible.
Rafael experiences his professional role as a facilitator with the program as an extension of this positionality, which
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he interprets within the framing of community development. “We have to be an example, to show them. We must
inspire them to change” (interview, December 6, 2018).
Community development and the work of class
Community development as a means of organizing people for directed change originates in the institutional innova-
tions of emancipatory twentieth-century social movements. Its principles of devolved leadership and self-education
were appropriated by governments looking to enroll rural populations into social modernization strategies. The
British Colonial Office saw the potential usefulness of the mass education approach as a vehicle for low-cost rural
development that could be overseen by local authorities in the territories under its control. In parts of Africa under
British colonial rule, techniques of mobilization originating in the enforcement of Native Authority regulations
were combined with methods for community problem solving using local intermediaries (Holford 1988, 171; Jelli-
coe 1978, 158). Educated people were allocated responsibilities as role models in their capacities as public servants
or as volunteers, assuming designated roles in development projects as instructors and community representatives
(Brown and Green 2015). The changed priorities set in place by the Colonial Development and Welfare Acts in
the period after the Second World War anticipating the end of colonial administration accelerated the formaliza-
tion of community development as a distinct domain of development expertise through international trainings,
information sharing, and journals (Holford 1988; Page 2014).
The class-based architecture of community development proved a convenient framework for the postindepen-
dence administration of national development in Tanzania (Chachage 1988). The organization of Nyerere’s strategy
of kujitegemea (self-reliance) through village committees became a global template for rural development dissemi-
nated through agencies such as UNICEF and Oxfam, which had been active in Tanzania, and through burgeoning
international networks (Jellicoe 1978, 158; Jennings 2002). Community development as postcolonial professional
practice discursively aligned with radical goals for participatory learning and community empowerment was assim-
ilated into top-down development bureaucracies as a modality of local planning (Apthorpe 1970).
Tensions between local empowerment and central directives continue to shape community development as
a social technology of project implementation (Green 2014). Community development both as a professional
competence and as a department of local and central government, in Tanzania and elsewhere, remains premised
on the principle of voluntaristic change facilitated through oversight from interstitial intermediaries acting on
behalf of central government authorities (Page 2014, 863). Instruction and formal oratory are an essential aspect
of community development practice in Tanzania, through speeches, seminars, and trainings (Jellicoe 1978, 181).
Teachers are elevated as development role models, and community engagement interactions conform to dyadic
templates of classroom instruction (Phillips 2013).
PSSN uses the vertical configuration of community development to enact a vision of development as the
devolved responsibility of certain categories of persons to change in a direction presented to them by persons closer
to embodying this change themselves. Notions of work and education assimilated into enduring conceptualizations
of development in Tanzania, held by rich and poor alike, are instrumental to its transition imaginary—“work”
(kazi) as the foundation of self-reliance and the pathway to personal and national development (Brennan 2006, 403;
Caplan 2007) and “education” (elimu) as re-creating the developmental self through training and learning.
“Slow” implementation and labor making
As a project of a social action fund that operates through community-driven development, PSSN is implemented by
local government authorities.14 Social action fund personnel work with district staff to facilitate program activities
in villages in rural districts and mitaa, or “streets,” in urban areas. These situate transfers of money through the
program as a mechanism for the transfer of values essential for developmental change. Demonstrating personal
8 Economic Anthropology, Online ISSN: 2330-4847
Cash Transfers and Community Development in Tanzania
transformation as achieved through responsibility and hard work structure performative events at which groups
of beneficiaries are brought together to be “sensitized” to how they should be changing. District staff, seconded
to the program as facilitators for these events, and as development exemplars, use their rhetorical skills to prompt
people to narrate their stories of being changed by the program, thereby becoming examples for others. Community
management committees, selected by village governments, oversee its activities in their localities. Members of the
management committees typically have higher levels of education and are younger than the representatives of
beneficiary households. Several of the young men and women I interviewed in urban Temeke were keen to do
this work as development volunteers (fieldnotes, March 2019), occupying a formal intermediary position between
implementors and beneficiaries and between unpaid work and more secure employment (Brown and Green 2015).
District staff work with committee members and members of village councils to select beneficiaries, monitor
conditionalities, manage payouts, and run community sessions.
Committee members receive a small allowance (posho) equivalent to the monthly basic transfer a beneficiary
household receives for the payout days on which they perform official duties. A larger allowance was paid if someone
accompanied district staff to collect funds, an occasional occurrence given the division of work between a full
committee of fourteen members. In 2018, daily allowances (posho) for district and program staff, supplementary
to their salaries, were around six times the monthly unconditional payment for a beneficiary household. Village
chairpersons, unsalaried, and village executive officers, who are paid a wage, also receive allowances on payout days
of 100,000 shillings, ten times the monthly basic transfers paid to beneficiary households.
Community sessions accompany payout days or, for those taking part in a mobile money pilot, receipt signing.
Attendance by the person designated responsible is a condition for remaining in the program. Community sessions
are held in public places, outside village offices or primary schools often used for making payments and signing
receipts. There may only be one day’s notice. Timings are uncertain. People expect that they will have to wait, perhaps
for hours, for the arrival of program staff with the paperwork and money. Gathering the group for instruction and
managing the payouts can take several more hours. Waiting in place and listening to the brief interlude of the
instruction session consume much of the day for many people.
Participation in public works as part of PSSN adapts previous elements of social action fund activities in which
low-paid labor supplements the labor contribution levied from local residents toward community projects. Public
works in PSSN use the labor of beneficiary households for basic infrastructure projects selected from a menu
provided by the program. Component design assumes that beneficiary households can control labor of household
members and that the pay will be used collectively to preserve household assets that would otherwise be at risk
of depletion during the shortage season. Most people laboring on public works are older women and men and
women with children designated responsible for their households. Where younger people perform this labor for a
beneficiary household, they usually expect some payment for it. In Chamwino, the only district where the public
works component was in place during the time of my fieldwork, beneficiaries who were unable to undertake the work
themselves would send a young person, not necessarily a member of their household, to do the work, dividing the
payment between them. Adult children, some in later middle age and living in separate households, also provided
this service for their elderly parents.
Public works participation is organized in groups on projects selected by village governments from a standard
list. The labor dimension is simultaneously onerous, certainly for people who are old or frail, and tokenistic. Only
hand tools are used. Rates of pay are set below market rates to encourage “self-targeting.” Participation is restricted to
a single member of a beneficiary household for a maximum of sixty days during the hungry season. Unlike kibarua
(casual labor), paid daily or as piecework, pay for public works is not immediate. Beneficiaries receive what they
have earned with their regular payments, often several months after the work has been completed. People work for
three hours a day, so as not to exclude the frail and to leave people time for other activities.
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The typical scene is of middle-aged women and older women, with a few much older men, working slowly
and with great effort, being told what to do by a number of younger people who are better dressed standing
watching them. Technical aspects of construction are overseen by a hired contractor. Representatives from the
village government and the community management committee model their interactions on community sessions.
Beneficiaries are reminded why they are working, why they have been included in the program, and what they must
do with their money when they are eventually paid.
Community sessions are conducted in the ritualized oratorial style of development mobilization. Lengthy
formulaic greetings and call-and-response engagement around rhetorical questions to do with program objectives
are followed by instructional speeches about what people should be doing with their money. Younger urban-styled
district officers perform polite respect for the older persons sitting on the ground through appropriate greetings
while talking to them as if they are schoolchildren who do not understand the basics of how to manage their everyday
spending. Improving their houses by buying corrugated metal sheets for roofs and keeping chickens is mentioned
frequently, along with purchasing community health insurance, joining a savings group, and buying uniforms for
schoolchildren, all indicators of success through which the program is evaluated.
Participants are asked why they haven’t yet bought chickens or metal sheets, or why they have not yet joined a
savings group. They need to show that they have done something with the money that will improve their lives. “Who
would you rather be? Someone who has passed? Or someone who has failed?” (fieldnotes, October 3, 2018), asked a
facilitator in Ulanga. Understanding beneficiary trajectories in terms of passing and failing equates transformation
and development with education, reinforcing the status of education as the “voice of development” and the symbolic
power of training and education in development transformation (Phillips 2013, 638). A community development
officer working in the urban district patiently explained to me that what the program refers to in social protection
policy speak as “graduation,” connotes someone exiting from support due to possible livelihood improvements
(Samson 2015), meaning “leaving the program and getting a certificate” (interview, February 28, 2019).
Continuity and class in Tanzanian development
I began this piece by suggesting that the concept of convenience could generate insights into a development program
that was organized to be as time consuming and labor making as possible. My discussion has outlined ways in which
cash transfer programs in development “based on the appealingly simple device of providing poor people with
monthly cash payments” (Ferguson 2014, 113) are complex social arrangements designed to convey representation
of development, theorizations of economic change, and accompanying moral values. PSSN is organized through
time-consuming bureaucratic activities and making visible certain kinds and qualities of work (Strauss 1985,
3). This centers on performance of self-transformation by showing one’s disposition to work and rejection of
laziness that would indicate a “handout mentality.” Ideas about laziness as antithetical to development are equated
with resistance to self-reliance, as they are across the region (e.g., Dawson and Fouksman 2020; Lavers 2019;
Seekings 2017).
The rhetoric of hard work and self-reliance is contradicted by the realities of an economic order created
through the asset-based welfare strategies of the middle classes, whose extraction of rents from the poor seeking
access to land for farming contributes to the poor’s structural vulnerability (Sayer 2018). Allowances paid to
implementors of development programs in Tanzania delineate the developmental ordering of class entitlement
in which middle classes expect recognition of their developed status because it is their development that enables
the development of others. Implementation through local governments aligns the organization of the program
with established conventions for social programming through the institution of community development as the
traditional organization of social modernization. Attitudes and values about the proper behavior and responsibilities
of the poor are distributed through the program, along with class relations.
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Foreign funding agencies committed to cash transfers as vectors of “fast policy” (Peck 2011; Peck and
Theodore 2015) that conveniently package standardized social protection and financialization instruments repre-
sent PSSN, and programs like it, as evidence-based responses to the challenges faced by households living in extreme
poverty. Elements of what are claimed as innovative practice, mainly technology based, are piloted within the pro-
gram. PSSN has trialed training for entrepreneurs using digital technologies, payments through mobile networks,
and techniques for managing personal finances designed by behavioral economists. The emphasis on novelty and
innovation, including the cash payment itself, detracts from the important ways in which these programs repro-
duce preexisting development orderings. The “slow” work of implementation, and the relations it enacts, re-create
the durable organizational forms through which citizens are brought into initiatives categorized as development by
government and other agencies. What are represented as novel departures in development social policy perpetuate
prevailing attitudes toward social assistance and the class relations through which they are realized.
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Notes
1 Expansions of state systems of welfare provision in southern Africa are partial exceptions to this in that they are state systems rather than projects, but
they are limited to older people and children.
2 The United Republic of Tanzania is made up of Tanzania mainland and the semiautonomous People’s Republic of Zanzibar.
3 Historical materials on community development were consulted in the Tanzania National Archives, Dar es Salaam; the British Archives at Kew; and the
Institute of Education Archives at London University.
4 Recent examples include Badue and Ribeiro (2018), Cookson (2018), Donovan (2015), Morton (2015), Neumark (2020), and Olivier de Sardan and Piccoli
(2018).
5 According to the World Bank’s evaluation study, the program aims to reach 9.7% of households below the national food poverty line and 5% of transient
poor (Rosas et al. 2019, 10).
6 Conditional cash transfer programs initially developed in Latin America adhere to a maternalist interpretation of social policy. Payments are made to women
because they are assumed to be more involved in caring for the children in a household than men are (Cookson 2018; Molyneux 2006).
7 This is based on what interviewees said in interviews. The World Bank’s midterm evaluation presents this as an intentional strategy to enable the comparison
of the impacts of public works plus cash versus cash transfers or, in the evaluation language of the randomized controlled trial (RCT), which has become
influential in legitimating an “experimental” approach to development (see Donovan 2018), the effects of different “treatments” (Rosas et al. 2019).
8 Additional financial and technical inputs were supplied by agencies, including the United Kingdom’s DFID and Sweden’s SIDA (Jacob and Pedersen 2018;
Ulriksen 2020).
9 Which translates as “no messing about, we’re serious.” Although Magufuli, who died suddenly in March 2021, attracted criticism for repression of
opposition parties and reducing political freedoms, he achieved mass popularity through a tough anticorruption stance and commitment to improving
Tanzania’s economic position.
10 Ethiopians and Botswanans hold similar views (Lavers 2019; Seekings 2017).
11 For accounts of how older people in Zambia and Botswana have to perform entitlement to community assistance, see Cliggett (2001) and Livingston (2003).
12 In 1961, a senior civil servant could expect to earn a salary equivalent to eighty times the minimum wage. This fell to 15 to 1 in 1974 (Bujra 1983;
Green 1975, 23).
13 All names are pseudonyms.
14 For a critical analysis of community-driven development (CDD) in relation to neoliberal policy rationalities, see Li (2017).
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